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SYMPOSIUM 1999
Women, Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open
Questions
Forum on Married Women and the Income Tax:
Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses
of the 1 0 5 th Congress

Panel 1:
Observing Money, Marriage and Taxation

ProfessorAnn F. Thomas
PROF. THOMAS: Marriage penalties and marriage bonuses
in income the tax are in the news but they are not new.' Indeed, even
in the halcyon days of individual income tax returns, between 1913
and 1948, there was often a marriage penalty in the form of a married
couple's shared personal deduction. In 1913 married couples shared a
personal deduction of $4,000 and unmarried individuals and spouses
living apart were each entitled to their own $3,000 personal
deduction.2 Sole earner married couples received a marriage bonus of
a $10 tax savings and dual income couples paid a marriage penalty of

$20.
Naturally, people complained about this and, interestingly,
they called it a marriage penalty. Conservatives described it as antimarriage and feminists said it devalued women.3 However, marriage
penalties remained a feature of the income tax for much of that period.
See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27
STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1429-31 (1975) (describing the marriage penalty as it operated after
1971).
2 See, e.g., Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 168 (codified as I.R.C.

§ 11A (1913)).

3 For a modem restatement of these views see Ben Wildavsky, Richer or
Poorer, NAT'L J.,
Aug. 15, 1998, at 1916 (describing the social conservative's concern
that the marriage penalty is "anti-marriage"); see also Liewelyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Resort
to Income Splitting, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1998, at A12 (describing the feminist view
that the marriage penalty is unfair to women).
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Today we have even more varieties of marriage penalties and bonuses
than ever before, and the numbers look very different.
Dr. O'Neill has outlined the numbers for us. The magnitude
of the penalty and bonus issue is considerable; with about $33 billion
in marriage penalties, and $41 billion in marriage bonuses in the
aggregate each year, most married couples in the United States are
affected by this aspect of the income tax.4 This is, obviously, an
important question. Moreover, it is one that requires a multidisciplinary approach to resolve. One of our goals in putting together
this symposium is to stimulate and support a dialogue between social
scientists and legal scholars working on marriage penalty and
marriage bonus issues. Tax law does not hold all the answers and
economics does not hold the entire answer either, but together we can
talk about what the issues are and what the possible solutions are.
The format for our panel will be as.follows: the Moderators
will make brief introductions and each panelist will have about ten
minutes to speak. Then, after all members of the panels have had
their say, the Moderator will start some questions and let the panelists
talk to each other and then open questions to the floor.
Our first Panel this morning has, primarily, a social science
focus, looking at some of the assumptions about financial behavior
within marriage that underlie our current structure of taxation for
married couples. We are going to move right into the first panel
presentation and hear first from Leslie Whittington, who is an
economist. Leslie is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at
Georgetown University in Washington D.C. Along with co-author
James Aim, she has written a very influential series of papers and
5
articles about tax policy and marriage behavior of different kinds.
4 See Proposals to Reduce Taxes: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways
and Means, 105th Cong. (forthcoming) (1998) (statement of June E. O'Neill, Director of
the Congressional Budget Office), available in <www.house.gov/ways_means/fullcomm/

testimony/2-4-98/2-onei.htm> (visited Oct. 14, 1999) (showing that a majority of couples
filing joint 1996 returns was affected by either a marriage bonus or penalty) (hereinafter
Proposals to Reduce Taxes).
5 See, e.g., James AIm and Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and Rise
of the Marriage Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 571 (1996); see also James AIm & Leslie A.
Whittington, Income Taxes and the Marriage Decision, in APPLIED ECON 25, Jan. 1, 1995,
(Chapman and Hall 1995); see also James Aim and Leslie A. Whittington, Does the
...

Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (1995) [hereinafter Marital

